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Abstract This article discusses Oppenheimer’s theory on marriage timing,
reviews the way this theory was received in European demography and family
sociology, and develops a new test of the theory using annual panel data from 13
European countries for the period 1994–2001. Several indicators of men’s economic
status are used, including school enrollment, employment, type of labor contract,
work experience, income, and education. Effects of these indicators are estimated
for the transition to marriage and cohabitation, as well as for the transition from
cohabitation to marriage. Country differences in these effects are examined as well.
The evidence provides strong support for the male breadwinner hypothesis on the
one hand, and for Oppenheimer’s career uncertainty hypothesis on the other.
However, the relevance of these hypotheses also depends on the national context,
and especially on the way gender roles are divided in a society.
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Re ´sume ´ Dans cet article relatif a ` la the ´orie d’Oppenheimer sur le calendrier du
mariage, nous examinons la manie `re dont cette the ´orie a e ´te ´ perc ¸ue par la
de ´mographie europe ´enne et la sociologie de la famille et nous testons a ` nouveau
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DOI 10.1007/s10680-011-9238-xcette the ´orie a ` l’aide de donne ´es de panel annuel collecte ´es dans 13 pays europe ´ens
au cours de la pe ´riode 1994–2001. Diffe ´rents indicateurs du statut e ´conomique de
l’homme sont utilise ´s, tels que la scolarisation, l’emploi, le type de contrat de
travail, l’expe ´rience professionnelle, le revenu et le niveau d’instruction. Les effets
de ces indicateurs sont estime ´s pour l’entre ´e dans le mariage ou la cohabitation,
ainsi que pour le passage de la cohabitation au mariage. Les diffe ´rences entre pays
des effets de ces indicateurs sont e ´galement examine ´es. Les re ´sultats appuient
fortement l’hypothe `se de l’homme en tant que soutien e ´conomique de la famille
d’une part, et d’autre part l’hypothe `se d’instabilite ´ professionnelle d’Oppenheimer.
Cependant, la pertinence de ces hypothe `ses de ´pend e ´galement du contexte national,
et plus spe ´cialement de la re ´partition des ro ˆles selon le genre dans la socie ´te ´ e ´tudie ´e.
Mots-cle ´s Mariage  Cohabitation  Instruction  Emploi  Revenu  Europe
1 Bringing Men Back in
The American demographer and sociologist Valerie Oppenheimer wrote a series of
inﬂuential articles in which she emphasized the role of men’s socioeconomic
position in demographic change, in particular in the declining rates of marriage and
the underlying tendency to increasingly postpone and perhaps even forego marriage
(Oppenheimer 1988, 2000, 2003; Oppenheimer et al. 1997). In this contribution, I
review Oppenheimer’s original theoretical study, I discuss how her study was held
up in empirical research in Europe, and I provide a new test of the theory for the
European setting. In doing so, I try to resolve some remaining gaps in the empirical
literature, and I evaluate whether the theory is equally valid in different countries
that make up the European context. Given the recent economic crisis in the United
States and in Europe, and the growing concerns about economic inequality, the
inﬂuence of men’s economic position on marriage and family formation remains a
vital concern.
At the time Oppenheimer began writing her articles on how men’s economic
position inﬂuenced marriage formation—in the late 1980s and early 1990s—this
was generally not a popular idea. The declining rates of marriage and increasing
rates of divorce were typically conceptualized in terms of an ‘‘erosion of marriage.’’
This erosion was explained in two different ways. One theory looked for the culprit
in the growing economic role of women in society. This theory was voiced by
demographers and economists working from a micro-economic perspective (Becker
1981; Espenshade 1985; Farley 1988), although, as Oppenheimer noted (1988,
p. 575), it bore a strong resemblance to classic sociological theories formulated by
functionalists like Talcot Parsons (Parsons 1949). The explanation basically argued
that more symmetrical economic roles of men and women would lead to a decline in
the gains to marriage, or to put it in Parsonian terms, would undermine marital
solidarity.
The second explanation argued that the decline of marriage was related to value
change, and in particular to the increasing need for individual autonomy on the one
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the other. This second perspective was expressed more strongly by European
demographers like Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa although it was also used by the
inﬂuential American demographers at the time (Bumpass 1990; Rindfuss and Van
den Heuvel 1990). In their Second Demographic Transition theory, Lesthaeghe and
Van de Kaa argued that ideological change in combination with secularization was
driving not only the postponement of marriage, but also the increase in cohabitation,
the rise in divorce, and the decline of fertility (Lesthaeghe 1983; Lesthaeghe and
Meekers 1986; Lesthaeghe and Surkuyn 1988; Van de Kaa 1987). While the ﬁrst
explanation saw the engine of the demographic transition in economic change, the
second emphasized the primacy of cultural change. Both theories, however, were
pessimistic about the future of marriage: the economic perspective saw marriage as
incompatible with symmetrical gender roles, the second saw it as incompatible with
individualistic values.
While there was a considerable debate between the proponents of economic and
cultural explanations, Oppenheimer criticized both perspectives. First, she ques-
tioned the empirical evidence for the theories. For example, she noted that there
were no signs of a so-called independence effect. Women with attractive economic
resources were not less likely to enter marriage, as would be predicted from the
micro-economic perspective (Oppenheimer and Lew 1995). Although women’s
employment and education had an effect on fertility and divorce, this did not appear
to be the case for marriage timing (Oppenheimer 1997). Oppenheimer also had
empirical critique on the cultural perspective. When looking at simple descriptive
statistics on what people want for themselves—on people’s hopes and desires—she
noted that the majority of both single men and women still wanted to be married
(Oppenheimer 1994). The anti-marriage ideology may have existed in feminist
circles or in the pop culture of the sixties, but it had not spread to a larger audience
in the way that, for example, egalitarian gender norms had done.
Oppenheimer also had theoretical criticisms of the two explanations (Oppenhei-
mer 1994, 1997). First, she believed that the theories were basically about
nonmarriage and not about delays in marriage. As other demographers also had
observed, the declining marriage rate was primarily driven by increases in the age at
marriage, and not so much by a decline in the proportion of persons who marry
eventually, although the latter could of course not yet be observed in the late 1980s.
Oppenheimer believed that people were postponing marriage, not foregoing it. This
seems by and large correct now, although the proportion of the marrying persons
among the lower educated in the United States did appear to decline (Goldstein and
Kenney 2001). A second part of her theoretical critique was against the micro-
economic model of specialization. Quoting historical demographic work, Oppen-
heimer noted that wives in the past had always worked for pay when circumstances
required this. Wives worked to make ends meet when the husband was not making
enough money, when he was unemployed, or when household costs were
temporarily pressing (Oppenheimer 1982). Oppenheimer argued that specialization
in marriage is an inﬂexible and risky strategy in many different societal contexts. If
marriage was not based on a model of full specialization in the more distant past,
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wives began to work?
Oppenheimer not only criticized the then dominant perspectives on demographic
change, she also presented an alternative. Her explanation can be placed in the
economic rather than the cultural camp, but it was different in that it focused on men
rather than women. During the 1980s and 1990s, young men’s economic position in
the United States had deteriorated quickly, especially for those with little schooling.
In the poor and uncertain economic prospects of young men, Oppenheimer saw an
important potential for understanding the decline of marriage. Because the earlier
explanation had focused more on women—especially through arguments about
women’s economic independence—one could say that Oppenheimer was in fact
‘‘bringing men back into the debate.’’ She did this in two different ways.
First, she reinstated older Malthusian ideas about the economic costs of marriage
(Hajnal 1965; Easterlin 1980). As setting up and running a household costs money,
men who are unable to fulﬁll the role of breadwinner will not be attractive marriage
partners and fathers. Oppenheimer recognized that this traditional male-breadwinner
hypothesis may have lost some of its force when gender roles become more
symmetrical. Nonetheless, she argued that it would also be naive to expect men’s
economic resources to become unimportant in inﬂuencing marriage prospects: this
would be ‘‘throwing out the baby with the bathwater.’’
The second way in which she brought men back in the debate was through her
uncertainty hypothesis (Oppenheimer 1988). The argument is that unstable careers,
as indicated by low-status jobs, nonemployment, and irregular and temporary
employment, signal uncertainty. This uncertainty applies not only to whether the
husband will be able to provide in the future, but also to the type of life he will lead.
Work structures the lifestyle a person will develop, and when men have not yet
settled in their career it is difﬁcult to predict what married life will be like. In this
way, employment uncertainty impedes assortative mating and may therefore delay
marriage.
An important difference between the breadwinner and the uncertainty hypotheses
is that the former focuses primarily on the ﬁnancial aspects of employment whereas
the latter is also concerned with its social consequences. An implication is that the
neo-Malthusian argument would be fully covered by effects of income, whereas the
uncertainty argument would also be reﬂected in indicators like irregular attachment
to the labor market, the amount of work experience, career trajectories, and
temporary employment. In a separate article, Oppenheimer also developed and
operationalized the concept of a stopgap job, i.e., a job that is not a reﬂection of an
employee’s educational credentials and that is meant as temporary by both employer
and employee (Oppenheimer and Kalmijn 1995). Men in such stopgap jobs would
postpone marriage because they are not settled in their career and therefore cannot
yet make a suitable match in the marriage market.
Compared to the other two perspectives, Oppenheimer’s theory has a more
optimistic implication for the future of marriage. The prevailing explanations were
rather pessimistic about the future of marriage—after all, female labor force
participation was unlikely to decline in the future and individualism did not appear
to be receding. In Oppenheimer’s theory, the economic position of young men
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to have cyclical rather than linear trend patterns, the economic position of young
men could improve and this would then have positive repercussions for marriage.
Moreover, the theory only implies the postponement of marriage until men
accumulate more work experience and become settled in their career, and not an
erosion of the institution of marriage, as the other theories seem to imply.
Oppenheimer’s explanation had a second attractive feature: it could also explain
another important demographic trend, namely the rise in cohabitation (Oppenheimer
2003). Oppenheimer argued that a man’s failure to provide economically would be
less of a problem for cohabitation than for marriage. For many couples, cohabitation
is a trial stage before marriage, and it may be that uncertainty about a young man’s
position is more tolerable during the cohabiting stage than it would be for a long-
term commitment to marriage. Assuming that the costs of breaking up a cohabiting
union are lower, cohabitation can therefore provide a way for couples to reduce
uncertainty about future career prospects. In a sense, Oppenheimer argued that a
cultural innovation like cohabitation before marriage (on a massive scale) was the
outcome of economic needs rather than the result of ideological change. In line with
this, other authors even argued that cohabitation is a rational response to
uncertainty: a ﬂexible partnership well-suited for a ﬂexible labor market (Mills
et al. 2005).
In the United States, many studies have tested Oppenheimer’s theory. American
research generally supports the view that poor economic prospects for men are
associated with a delay in marriage. This has been demonstrated for a range of
indicators, including employment per se, unstable employment, low earnings, and
other indicators of career ‘‘immaturity’’ (Clarkberg 1999; Lichter et al. 1992; Lloyd
and South 1996; Mare and Winship 1991; Oppenheimer 2003; Oppenheimer et al.
1997; Sassler and Schoen 1999; Smock and Manning 1997; Sweeney 2002; Xie
et al. 2003). There is also evidence in the United States that cohabitation is less
strongly inﬂuenced by men’s economic position than marriage, although there is no
clear reverse income effect, i.e., that the poor are being selected into cohabiting
unions. Furthermore, in the United States, the income effect on marriage timing
appears to be stable over time. Sweeney (2002) compared two cohorts in the United
States and found that in the cohort marrying during the 1980s and 1990s, men’s
income had an equally strong positive effect on the entry into marriage as in the
cohort marrying during the 1960s and 1970s (Sweeney 2002).
2 Testing the Theory in Europe
In this article, I develop a new test of Oppenheimer’s theory for the European
context. There are several reasons to expect Oppenheimer’s theory to also apply to
Europe. First, the demographic trends that occurred in Europe were similar,
although sometimes less dramatic and sometimes occurring later. The age at
marriage has risen, the rate of marriage has declined, and cohabitation has increased
as well (Kiernan 2002; Lesthaeghe 1983; Van de Kaa 1987). Second, many
European countries experienced economic problems that were similar to those in the
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as young adults, ethnic minorities, and women. Several authors argued that partly in
response to economic globalization, young European men (and women) faced
increasing levels of economic uncertainty in their transition from school to work
(Blossfeld et al. 2005). In many European countries, especially in Southern Europe,
levels of youth unemployment were even higher than in the United States, a
phenomenon which has often been linked to the higher degrees of employment
protection in Europe (Mu ¨ller and Gangl 2003; Nickell 1997).
There are also reasons to believe that the theory would be less applicable to
Europe. One counter argument lies in the role of the welfare state. In several
European societies, and particularly in social-democratic welfare states like
Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, social security is more generous and more
universally provided than it is in the United States (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Esping-
Andersen 1993). This means that in many European countries, young men receive
unemployment beneﬁts when they are out of work. Moreover, for those who have
never worked, basic welfare is provided, albeit at a minimum level. As a result,
young jobless men can still bear the cost of setting up a household. Following the
neo-Malthusian argument, it could thus be argued that employment problems do not
per se lead to marriage postponement in Europe. A rebuttal of this point is that
Oppenheimer’s argument about uncertainty and assortative mating, which is not
only about money, but also about stability and predictability, could still apply to
Europe. A young man who is on unemployment beneﬁts remains an uncertain
candidate on the marriage market even if he has the ﬁnancial means to support a
household at that point in time.
Another important difference between the American and the European case lies
in the degree of heterogeneity. Although the United States is certainly not a
homogeneous country—there are important ethnic, racial, and regional differ-
ences—it is fair to say that Europe is more heterogeneous (at least regionally) than
the United States. In comparative studies, it has often been argued that European
countries can be rated on a continuum from more traditional societies such as Spain,
Greece, and Italy on the one hand, to more modern and more economically
developed societies such as Sweden and the Netherlands on the other (Hagenaars
et al. 2003). These differences are expressed in a number of social and cultural
domains, including differences in marriage and family living. For example, in more
traditional European societies, cohabitation and divorce are less common and less
accepted, marriage has a higher social status, gender roles in marriage are more
unequal, female labor force participation is lower, and extended family ties are
stronger (Hans-Peter Blossfeld and Hakim 1997; Gelissen 2003; Kalmijn 2003;
Knudsen and Waerness 2008; Reher 1998). These indicators are strongly correlated,
both with each other and with the level of economic development in a country
(GDP). This degree of heterogeneity suggests that Oppenheimer’s theory may not
apply equally to all European countries. For example, in contexts where gender
roles are more egalitarian, men’s economic situation could be less important for the
entry into marriage and cohabitation. In these settings, men are not the only
breadwinners and women’s economic resources should be of growing importance,
making men’s economic resources less important.
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source of evidence comes from a large multi-nation project initiated by the German
sociologist Blossfeld and his colleagues (Blossfeld et al. 2005). In this project,
Blossfeld brought together a number of demographers and sociologists from
different parts of the world (with an overrepresentation of European countries), with
the aim of examining the effect of men and women’s individual economic resources
on the timing of marriage and parenthood. While the authors used their own
country-speciﬁc longitudinal data, they used similar methods and variables, leading
to a reasonably uniform and comparable set of outcomes. The project’s goal was to
test the exact same set of hypotheses in each country. The hypotheses were
borrowed in part from Oppenheimer’s work but they were translated by Mills and
Blossfeld to make them ﬁt for a broader societal setting (Mills and Blossfeld 2005).
The articles were combined in a volume for which Oppenheimer wrote the foreword
(Blossfeld et al. 2005).
The articles in Blossfeld’s volume provide generally positive evidence for the
theory in the European countries studied (Germany, the Netherlands, France,
Sweden, Hungary, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain). In virtually all countries, school
enrollment—one of the indicators of uncertainty—negatively affected the entry into
marriage. More importantly, men’s unemployment appeared to lower the chances of
entering marriage in most countries (Bernardi and Nazio 2005; Kieffer et al. 2005;
Kurz et al. 2005; Liefbroer 2005; Noguera et al. 2005; Robert and Bukodi 2005). In
Britain, an effect of unemployment was observed only on the transition from
cohabitation to marriage, and not on the transition from being single to living
together (Francesconi and Golsch 2005). In Sweden, only unemployment after
leaving school appeared to delay marriage formation, not unemployment after a
period of employment (Bygren et al. 2005). Some evidence was also found for the
effect of temporary contracts. In Italy, Spain, France, and the Netherlands, it was
shown that men who were employed temporarily were less likely to enter marriage
than men who had permanent employment. In Germany and Hungary, there was no
effect of temporary work, however, and in several other countries, the effect could
not be studied. A recent analyses of fertility in Europe has also pointed to the
delaying effect of temporary contracts (Adsera 2011).
Outside the Blossfeld project, there were a number of important individual
articles in which aspects of Oppenheimer’s theory were tested. For example, in
Sweden, it was found that men’s employment increased the chances of union
formation while it did not affect the chances of marriage after cohabitation (Bracher
and Santow 1998). In Norway, men’s employment increased the chances of
marrying after being single and the chance of marrying after living together
(Kravdal 1999). In the Netherlands, men’s employment had a stronger effect on
direct marriage than on cohabitation but there was no effect of employment on
marriage after cohabitation (Kalmijn and Luijkx 2005; cf. Liefbroer 2005). The
evidence outside Europe (i.e., Israel) has been supportive as well (Raz-Yurovich
2010), as has been the evidence in Central and Eastern Europe, a region not
included in the present article (Gerber and Berman 2010).
While the role of employment has often been studied in Europe, less is known
about how men’s income and earnings affect union formation. Many of the studies
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data. There are few good sources of large-scale panel data in Europe. The panel data
that exist have been collected by economists and labor market researchers and do
not always have the desirable demographic indicators. Because income cannot be
measured well in a retrospective fashion, this has also meant that we know little
about the income effects on marriage and divorce in Europe. This is unfortunate
because employment and income need to be examined simultaneously, especially if
one wants to make a distinction between the neo-Malthusian breadwinner
hypothesis on the one hand, and Oppenheimer’s uncertainty hypothesis on the
other. Because in many European welfare states nonemployment does not, per se,
mean no income, these two factors are not perfectly correlated.
Another drawback of the prevailing evidence is that most studies are based on
single countries. Blossfeld’s multi-nation project is clearly a major step forward in
trying to summarize the evidence for Europe as a whole, but the analyses are not
pooled so the results can only be summarized verbally. Moreover, possible
differences that exist between countries can be described but they cannot be
compared or tested in a more rigorous fashion. For these reasons, there is still work
to be done.
In the remainder of this article, I address the following research questions. First,
to what extent does men’s economic position affect union formation? In answering
this question, I not only look at employment, but also I look at men’s income, work
experience, and type of labor contract. By looking at income and employment
patterns simultaneously, I obtain more direct evidence on the underlying mecha-
nisms. The period for which I answer this question is 1994–2004. In virtually all
European countries, unemployment rates increased substantially in the early 1990s
before declining again in the mid to late 1990s (OECD 2009). In Italy, Greece, and
Belgium, unemployment remained high in the late 1990s but began to decline later,
in the early 2000s. In other words, for most countries, the period that I examine
covers a recovery stage of the economy, a stage which should have been positive for
marriage and family formation.
Second, are the effects of men’s economic position similar or different for the
chances of entering marriage and the chances of entering a cohabiting union? With
this part of the study, I replicate the last inﬂuential study of Oppenheimer (2003), in
which she studied this issue for the United States. We would expect effects to be
weaker for cohabitation than for marriage: marriage would require a stronger
economic underpinning than cohabitation (Kravdal 1999; Oppenheimer 2003). In
addition, I examine the chances that cohabiting unions turn into marriage. Here too,
Oppenheimer expects men’s economic position to have an effect, but because those
who cohabit already have an independent household, the effects of income will
probably be weaker.
Third, to what extent are the effects of men’s economic position on union
formation different across societal contexts? In this part, I focus on differences
between traditional and egalitarian societies. The expectation is that men’s
economic characteristics remain important in traditional societies but are less
important in more modern, egalitarian ones. By looking at differences among
societal contexts, I try to generalize the cross-cohort comparison that Sweeney
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importance because if we ﬁnd conditions under which the theory is (not) true, this
could in principle lead to theoretical progress in the ﬁeld.
3 Data, Methods, and Variables
I use panel data that are collected in the same format for a number of European
countries, i.e., the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP was
an annual panel survey held between 1994 and 2001 (Behr et al. 2005; Cle ´menceau
and Verma 1996). Samples are large and representative, and (almost) the same
questionnaire was used each year. For the analyses in this article, I use data from 13
countries: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France,
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece. My sample is
limited to men who were never married in the ﬁrst wave of the panel. Hence, I look
at the ﬁrst union formation. Although I am able to exclude previously married men,
I cannot exclude men who ended a cohabiting union before the panel began. Never
married men who were cohabiting in the ﬁrst wave are also included because these
men can make the transition from cohabitation to marriage. The ﬁrst wave of data
from the Netherlands is excluded because no information is available on
cohabitation status. The total number of men is 17,743.
There have been previous demographic analyses of the ECHP most notably by
Adsera (2011) who analyzes the effect of individual and aggregate labor market
characteristics on fertility. Although Adsera focused more on women than on men,
her general conclusion is that labor market uncertainty is very inﬂuential in delaying
fertility, in line with the perspective suggested above. In the current article, we go
back one step by analyzing how labor market uncertainty affects union formation, a
transition which probably remains the most important necessary condition for
family formation. We also focus explicitly on men.
3.1 Dependent Variables and Models
I use discrete time event-history analysis by estimating logistic regression models
on a person-year ﬁle. The person-year ﬁle begins at the ﬁrst wave and ends in the
last wave or when a transition is made. As is the case with all event-history analyses
of panel data, some men were already married in the ﬁrst wave. Such left truncation
problems can be solved in principle, but not without losing our time-varying
independent variables (Guo 1993). The ﬁrst logit model is estimated for person-
years in which men are single and never married. The dependent variable is whether
a man is living without a partner in wave t and living with a partner in wave t ? 1
(union formation). In the second logit model, I estimated which choice was made,
cohabitation or marriage, using only the person-years in which the event occurred.
This sequential approach is slightly different from the approach taken by
Oppenheimer, who estimated multinomial logit (i.e., competing risk) models
(2003). The sequential approach does not need the assumption implicit in a
competing risk model that the two choices—cohabitation and marriage—are
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that unmeasured factors like personality, wealth, attractiveness, and the like,
inﬂuence marriage and cohabitation to the same extent (Hill et al. 1993). If a person
is single in year t, missing in year t ? 1, and married or cohabiting in year t ? 2, I
also regarded this as an event. Duration dependency is modeled with two age
effects, according to the approach developed by Blossfeld and Huinink (1991).
Blossfeld used log (age—a1) and log (a2—age) to capture the nonlinear age-
dependency of union formation, where a1 is the lowest and a2 the highest age in the
sample. There were 4,492 transitions to a ﬁrst union of which 2,499 were to
cohabitation and 1,993 to marriage.
The second logit model is estimated for person-years in which men were living
with a partner without being married. The dependent variable is deﬁned as living
with a partner unmarried in wave t and being married in wave t ? 1 (marriage
after cohabitation). Respondents who were living alone in wave t ? 1 are
truncated. Hence, separation is treated as a competing risk. If a person is
cohabiting in year t, not in the panel in year t ? 1, and married in year t ? 2, I
also regarded this as an event. Duration dependency could not be modeled directly
because for those who are in a cohabitating union in the ﬁrst wave of the panel, no
data on the start of the union is available. As an alternative, I use age as a proxy.
Age is obviously less ideal than duration since persons enter a cohabiting union at
different ages. There were 1,498 transitions from cohabitation to marriage. It is
noted that there was no question in the interview about whether the partner in one
wave was the same partner as in the previous wave. Hence, I could not check if a
man changed (cohabiting) partners between the subsequent waves, nor could I
check if the married partner was the same person as the cohabiting partner in the
previous wave.
3.2 Independent Variables
All independent variables, except where noted, refer to time t. As the dependent
variables refer to whether or not a transition was made between the time t and t ? 1,
the independent variables precede the dependent variable in time. Employment is
measured with two dummy variables. The ﬁrst indicates a man is working on a paid
job or is self-employed at the time of the interview for at least 15 h a week. The
second variable indicates other less common forms of employment, such as military
service, apprenticeships, unpaid family work, and working less than 15 h. Given
that a man is employed, I also considered the type of contract he has. Temporary
contracts include ﬁxed-term or short-term contracts, casual work with no contract,
and ‘‘some other working arrangement’’ that is not a permanent contract (all
included within the 15? hours category). The coding is cumulative so that the effect
of temporary work refers to the difference between the men with a temporary
contract and men with a permanent contract. I also include whether a person is
enrolled in full-time schooling in the interview week.
Next to a man’s current situation, I consider his work history. Data on work
history are obtained from a monthly calendar that all respondents had to ﬁll out.
For the year t - 1, I counted the number of months that a man was employed,
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in the Netherlands. Means were imputed and a dummy-variable for the Netherlands
is included. I checked whether the effects of this variable were different when
excluding the Netherlands but this was not the case.
Income is the other main variable of interest. I consider personal income and not
only income from work since social security income may also provide a stable
source of income. Ideally, we would like to measure the income a man had in the
interview month or in the 12 months before the interview. Unfortunately, incomes
are measured for (full) calendar years only. To solve this, I took a weighted average
of the income in calendar year t - 1 and the income in calendar year t, using
information on the month of interview. For example, if the interview was in
September 1994, income for that person-year is 9/12 of the income earned in 1994
plus 3/12 of the income earned in 1993. It is noted that some of the income in year
t may be earned after a man marries. The weights are also addressing this problem.
Marrying in the year of the interview is more likely when the interview took place
early in the year, but then, this income receives a lower weight. I corrected all
incomes for changes in the Consumer Price Index and converted them to pounds
sterling. To estimate effects of income in a comparable way across countries, I used
a relative income measure. I ﬁrst calculated income quintiles in each country using
data from all men in the ﬁrst wave of the ECHP. Next, I used these quintiles to
categorize the men in the person-year ﬁle. I also use a linear income variable which
is coded 1–5 for the ﬁve quintiles.
Three control variables are used which may affect union formation: general
health (time varying), the highest level of educational attainment, and the year of the
interview (using dummies). Health is controlled because having a poor health may
be detrimental for ﬁnding a partner and is also related to job and income
opportunities (Waldron et al. 1996). Descriptive ﬁndings for the independent
variables for each country are presented in Table 1.
To explore differences across societies, I constructed two measures at the
macro level. First, I considered a measure of the division of household labor in
marriage in a society. This measure was obtained from a article by Knudsen and
Waerness (2008) and measures the extent to which husbands and wives share four
household tasks (i.e., laundry, grocery shopping, meal preparation, caring for sick
family members). The second measure is the female labor force participation rate
in the 1990s, which is deﬁned as the percentage of women aged 20–49 who are
active in the labor force (obtained from ILO, Geneva). The two macro-level
indicators are strongly correlated. Countries in which wives participate more often
in the labor force are also countries in which the household tasks are divided
more equally (r = .74). The most traditional societies are Southern European
countries, the most egalitarian are Northern European countries. Western
European countries are located in between these two. I construct a single
macro-level indicator, which is the means of the two standardized items. The
scale is also standardized.
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1234 Results
We start with some descriptive results. Figure 1 shows that there are small
differences within Europe in the age at ﬁrst union entry. In most countries, the mean
age at entry is between 27 and 29. Male age at entry is low in Portugal and Austria,
and high in the Netherlands and Italy. The differences do not coincide with a
modern-traditional continuum. For example, the age at union formation is quite high
in Italy and Greece where the family is a strong institution. This already points to
the potential importance of unemployment. In Southern Europe, youth unemploy-
ment is high. When we look at the type of ﬁrst union chosen by men, presented in
the left side of Fig. 1, we see clearer differences. In Western Europe, and even more
in Northern Europe, direct marriage is a minority experience. In many countries,
more than 80% of men cohabit ﬁrst. In Southern Europe, the proportions are almost
reversed: 60–80% of the men in these countries marry directly. The United
Kingdom resembles Western Europe but Ireland resembles the south, with most
men choosing marriage as their ﬁrst way to enter a union. This most likely reﬂects
the role of the Catholic church in Ireland.
The effects of men’s economic characteristics on union entry are presented in
Table 2. We discuss Model A ﬁrst, which includes employment variables but no
income variables. We note the important role of employment. The odds of entering
a union are 58% higher for employed men than for men who are not employed and
not in school (e
457). Interestingly, there is also an effect on the type of union.
Employed men have a 48% higher odds of marrying rather than cohabiting. Hence,
nonemployment is less incompatible with cohabitation than with marriage. The type
of labor contract also matters for the choice between marriage and cohabitation.
Compared to men with a permanent job, men with a temporary job who enter a
union are 23% less likely to choose marriage than cohabitation. We also note that
school enrollment has a negative effect on union entry while it does not affect the
type of union.
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Proportion of Men Married at Start of First Union
Denmark
Finland
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
France
Austria
Germany
Ireland
UK
20 22 24 26 28 30
Men's Mean Age at First Union
Denmark
Finland
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
France
Austria
Germany
Ireland
UK
Fig. 1 Men’s ﬁrst union formation in 13 countries
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123Next to the effects of current employment characteristics, we see effects of men’s
work history. The more months men were employed or otherwise active in the past
calendar year, the more likely they are to enter a union in the next two calendar
years. The magnitude of the effect is considerable. Men who were active for an
entire year were e
12 9 .022 = 30% more likely to enter a union in the next 2 years
than men who were inactive the entire year. This effect comes on top of the effect of
a man’s current employment situation. There is no effect of work history on the
choice between marriage and cohabitation.
In sum, the ﬁndings from Model A and Model D conﬁrm that men who are not
yet settled in their career postpone union formation. The ﬁndings also conﬁrm that
cohabitation is less sensitive to economic insecurity than marriage, although this
applies more to employment per se and the type of employment than to a man’s
work history.
In Model B and Model E, we add income variables to the model. We see that
income has a strong effect on union entry. The reference group is the middle
quintile. Each higher income group has a higher chance of entering a union. The
poorest quintile of men are 45% less likely to enter a union than the middle quintile,
while the richest quintile are 44% more likely to do so. The income effects increase
monotonically but the differences between the quintiles become smaller at higher
income levels. A formal test shows that the effect is not strictly linear: The nonlinear
model for union formation (Model B) has a better ﬁt than the linear model (Model
C, v
2 = 9.3, p = .03). When we look at the income effect on choice between the
marriage and cohabitation, we only see one marginally signiﬁcant effect. Men in the
lowest quintile who enter a union are 31% more likely than the middle quintile to
choose cohabitation rather than marriage (p = .054). This result seems to conﬁrm
the notion of cohabitation as the poor man’s marriage, although the poor are still
more likely not to enter a union in the ﬁrst place.
When we compare the two models for union entry (Model A and B), the
employment effects that we observed in Model A are reduced by more than half
once income is added to the model. In other words, the effects of employment and
work history run in part via income. Nevertheless, the employment effect remains
statistically signiﬁcant even when income is included, which means that the
inﬂuence of employment on union formation also has a non-ﬁnancial element. The
latter ﬁnding is in line with Oppenheimer’s uncertainty argument. It is also
interesting to observe that the effects of employment and temporary jobs on the
choice between the marriage and cohabitation are not affected by whether or not
income is added (compare Model D and E). This is logical, given the weaker
income effect on this outcome. Hence, the non-ﬁnancial aspects of work are more
important for the type of union than for the chance of entering a union in the ﬁrst
place. In this sense, Oppenheimer’s uncertainty theory seems to work better for the
type of union than for union formation per se.
Several of the control variables also have an effect. Men in good health are more
likely to enter a union. Moreover, men in good health more often choose marriage
than cohabitation. This conﬁrms theories about selection into marriage and suggests
that screening or selection may be less strong for cohabitation. Education, ﬁnally,
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123has a positive effect on union entry but these effects are reduced when income is
controlled for.
In the last columns of Table 2, we focus on marriage formation after
cohabitation (Model G, H, and I). We see that it is not affected by employment,
but being enrolled in school does reduce the chance of marrying. We also ﬁnd
that men who worked more months in the past are more likely to marry. Income
also has a signiﬁcant effect. The higher the men’s income during cohabitation,
the more likely they are to change from cohabitation to marriage. When
comparing the linear income effect on marriage after cohabitation with the linear
effect on initial union formation, it appears that income is less important for
marriage after cohabitation (b = .10) than it is for union formation after being
single (b = .21). This is in line with the neo-Malthusian hypothesis, which
suggests that it is primarily for initial union entry that the costs of setting up a
household play a role (although the wedding is a cost factor which applies
speciﬁcally to marriage).
The control variables also have effects on the transition to marriage. Men in good
health are more likely to experience a transition from cohabitation to marriage,
suggesting that the selection effects also play a role in the decision to marry, not
only in the decision to live together. We also see that higher educated cohabiting
men are more likely to marry, hence, for the higher educated, cohabitation is less
often seen as a long-term option. This effect is not explained by income.
Do the effects we found vary across societal contexts? To assess this, I
present interaction effects of key independent variables with the macro-level
indicator of traditional versus egalitarian societies. Interaction effects are
presented in Table 3.T h ep-values are based on standard errors that are
corrected for the clustering of cases within countries. This yields a more
conservative test for macro-level effects and is a good alternative to multilevel
models when the number of units at the macro level is limited. To check for
outliers at the country level, I calculated DFBETAs for the interaction effects of
modernization and employment, and of modernization and income, and re-
estimated the models while leaving out countries for which DFBETAs exceeded
the critical value (Kalmijn 2010; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). DFBETA is
calculated as the difference in an effect with and without the outlier divided by
the standard error of the effect. These outlier analyses are presented in the third
and fourth columns of Table 3.
In Table 3, we see a negative interaction of the societal index with men’s
employment (b =- .16, p\.01). Hence, the average effect of employment
(b = .50) is reduced by 32% for each standard deviation increase in the egalitarian
context (.16/.50). This shows that the effect of men’s employment on the entry into
a union is considerably weaker in more egalitarian countries than in more traditional
countries. I also present the effects for each country separately in a graph (Fig. 2). In
this graph, the effect of selected independent variables is plotted against the macro-
level index. Although the graph does not provide a test, like the interaction effect, it
does give a good intuitive feel of the importance of the interaction effect. In line
with expectations, the graph shows that in more traditional societies like Spain,
Italy, and Ireland, the effect of men’s employment is quite strong. In more
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123Table 3 Discrete time event history models of union formation with interactions: logit regression
coefﬁcients and p-values in parentheses
Model A all
cases
Model B all
cases
Model A w/o
outliers
Model B w/o
outliers
Ln (age—15) 0.953***
(0.000)
0.781**
(0.002)
0.943***
(0.001)
0.686*
(0.036)
Ln (65—age) 1.970***
(0.000)
1.956***
(0.000)
1.934***
(0.001)
2.040*
(0.010)
General health 0.121**
(0.001)
0.107**
(0.002)
0.102**
(0.006)
0.119*
(0.016)
Education secondary versus
primary
0.071
(0.287)
0.023
(0.732)
0.031
(0.638)
0.115
(0.079)
Education tertiary versus primary 0.271***
(0.000)
0.152*
(0.014)
0.248***
(0.000)
0.224***
(0.001)
Working 15? hours versus no
work/school
0.501***
(0.000)
0.194***
(0.000)
0.549***
(0.000)
0.175***
(0.000)
In school versus no versus no
work/school
-0.672***
(0.000)
-0.604***
(0.000)
-0.614***
(0.000)
-0.673***
(0.000)
Income linear 0.242***
(0.000)
0.243***
(0.000)
Index (traditional—egalitarian) 1.916
(0.177)
2.075
(0.144)
2.092
(0.262)
2.039
(0.327)
Index * ln (age—15) -0.278
(0.058)
-0.314*
(0.037)
-0.311
(0.110)
-0.217
(0.272)
Index * ln (65—age) -0.233
(0.442)
-0.262
(0.386)
-0.288
(0.471)
-0.309
(0.485)
Index * health -0.003
(0.914)
-0.004
(0.872)
-0.007
(0.718)
-0.005
(0.897)
Index * secondary education 0.079
(0.333)
0.087
(0.285)
0.086
(0.368)
0.121*
(0.041)
Index * tertiary education 0.119
(0.106)
0.130
(0.079)
0.139
(0.127)
0.205***
(0.000)
Index * working -0.158**
(0.001)
-0.122**
(0.001)
-0.152***
(0.000)
-0.098*
(0.043)
Index * enrolled 0.236**
(0.001)
0.210**
(0.002)
0.215**
(0.004)
0.288***
(0.000)
Index * income 0.002
(0.935)
-0.037**
(0.008)
Constant -13.107***
(0.000)
-12.953***
(0.000)
-12.853***
(0.000)
-13.112***
(0.000)
N 77621 77621 68837 58354
Note: Controlled for country and year dummies. p-values corrected for clustering. Outliers for Model A
are Denmark and Greece, for Model B these are Italy and the United Kingdom
* p\.05, ** p\.01, *** p\.001
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123egalitarian countries like the Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland, the effect is
weaker although generally not zero. We see similar interaction effects of school
enrollment and the societal index. Men’s enrollment in school deters union
formation but this effect is weaker in more egalitarian societies. Both interaction
effects are in line with the hypothesis.
Table 3 further shows no negative interaction of the societal index with men’s
income effect on union formation. After deleting two outliers (Italy and the United
Kingdom), the interaction becomes negative and signiﬁcant (b =- .037, p = .01).
Hence, for these 11 countries, the effect of men’s income on union formation is
weaker in more egalitarian countries than in more traditional countries. The
magnitude of the effect is a 15% reduction in the income effect per standard
deviation increase in the egalitarian context (.037/.234). When we look at the graph,
the pattern appears to be weaker than it was for employment. Spain and Portugal
reveal strong effects of men’s income and Denmark and the Netherlands have weak
effects. However, there are also outliers like the United Kingdom (stronger effect
than expected) and Italy and Belgium (weaker effect than expected).
So far, these results apply to union formation regardless of the type of union.
Traditional and egalitarian societies also differ in the extent to which cohabitation
occurs. The more egalitarian countries like Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands
also have the highest levels of cohabitation (Soons and Kalmijn 2009). Because
the effects of men’s economic position differ depending on whether marriage or
cohabitation is the outcome, the results could in part be due to such compositional
differences. For this reason, I also look at the entry into marriage only (either after
being single or after cohabitation). The interaction with employment is -.066
(p = .11), the interaction with enrollment is .326 (p\.01), and the interaction
with income is -.073 (p\.01). Hence, the employment interaction effect is
weaker in this model, although still negative, while the other interaction effects are
not affected. We therefore conclude that part of the reason why the employment
effects depend on the context lies in the fact that unions are more often unmarried
unions in more egalitarian societies. Even apart from that, however, there is
evidence that men’s economic status matters more for marriage in more traditional
societies.
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Fig. 2 Effects of men’s economic characteristics on union entry
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1235 Conclusion and Discussion
This article has re-examined the importance of Oppenheimer’s theory on marriage
timing in the European context. By and large, the European evidence supports the
theory. Unemployment, little work experience, low income, and temporary
employment on the part of men deter union formation. By analyzing income and
employment effects simultaneously in a panel perspective, it was possible to obtain
more direct evidence for the two contrasting hypotheses suggested by Oppenheimer,
i.e., the neo-Malthusian male breadwinner hypothesis and the career uncertainty
hypothesis (sometimes also called the career instability or immaturity hypothesis).
Many previous European analyses have not been able to take income into account
and have therefore not been able to separate these two mechanisms empirically.
My analyses ﬁrst show that income effects are strong and signiﬁcant, which
supports the male breadwinner hypothesis. Second, the income effects explain about
half of the effects of employment and work experience, suggesting that employment
effects by themselves are not sufﬁcient evidence for the uncertainty hypothesis.
However, the employment effects do not completely disappear once income is
added. This suggests that employment effects on union formation are more than just
a matter of ﬁnancial resources, in line with the uncertainty hypothesis.
By analyzing the choice between cohabitation and marriage, further evidence
could be obtained for the two hypotheses. Marriage in Europe appears to be more
sensitive to men’s economic position than cohabitation. Men who are not employed
or who have temporary jobs are more likely to choose cohabitation rather than
marriage. This ﬁnding provides additional evidence for the uncertainty hypothesis
since cohabitation is more like a trial marriage and hence, more compatible with
uncertainty in other life domains (i.e., employment). We do not, however, see a
clear income effect on the choice between marriage and cohabitation. Hence, the
choice between marriage and cohabitation has more to do with employment
uncertainty than with income. There is a small effect of the lowest income group,
however. Among men who enter a union, the 20% poorest men are more likely to
choose cohabitation. Hence, there is some evidence that cohabitation is the ‘‘poor
man’s marriage.’’
Following Oppenheimer’s last study, I also examined the transition from
cohabitation to marriage. We would expect economic uncertainty to also reduce the
chances of a transition from cohabitation to marriage, but in general, the effects we
ﬁnd are weaker for this transition. The weaker income effect could be due to the fact
that the cost of setting up a household plays no role for this transition. Income also
had little effect on the initial choice between marriage and cohabitation. While this
is in line with the neo-Malthusian argument, the ﬁnding that the employment effects
on the transition from cohabitation to marriage are also weaker is unexpected. Other
authors have found this too (e.g., Bracher and Santow 1998; Liefbroer 2005). Future
research is needed to ﬁnd out why this is the case. One speculation is that fertility
and housing play a role. If couples buy a house or have a child, they may decide to
marry. Although such transitions may be partly governed by economic uncertainty,
they may also be exogenous and hence reduce the effects of other determinants like
employment. Another speculation has to do with the lack of information on the
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123(female) partner. The partner may have become economically more secure during
the cohabitation stage, thereby promoting the transition to marriage, but we do not
observe such changes.
European countries differ considerably in terms of their economic, social, and
cultural characteristics, and so, it is important to also examine country variation in
the degree to which the theory applies. We hypothesized that men’s economic
position would be less inﬂuential in more developed countries where gender roles
are more symmetrical. We ﬁnd some evidence in support of this notion. The effects
of men’s employment and school enrollment on union formation are stronger in
more traditional societies than in more egalitarian ones. Income effects are also
weaker in egalitarian societies but the evidence for this pattern is weaker. Our
interpretation is that in egalitarian settings, the costs of setting up a household are
more often shared between men and women. Hence, men can afford to experiment
with their career if they have a partner who has a (more) stable career. Similarly,
women may attach less weight to the career options of men than they did in more
traditional circumstances and for instance, pay more attention to other traits, such as
men’s willingness to participate in child rearing.
My ﬁnding is in contrast to a previous cohort comparison for the United States
which suggested that men’s economic effects on marriage timing did not change
over time (Sweeney 2002). Perhaps this difference is due to the limited time period
that was examined in Sweeney’s trend study, a design which may have reduced the
variance in contextual gender roles. At the same time, however, it needs to be
investigated whether the patterns that I found still hold when a larger number of
countries is considered. The income interaction effects, for example, are sensitive to
outliers and therefore less convincing. More units at the macro-level will be needed
to conﬁrm this ﬁnding.
In closing, it is important to re-emphasize on the role of women. Although
Oppenheimer was justiﬁably ‘‘bringing men back’’ into the debate at a time when
there was too little attention on the changing economic fate of young (American)
men, the growing egalitarian model that is now supported by many couples in
Europe and the United States, suggests that men and women should be examined
simultaneously for a better understanding of trends and differentials in marriage and
cohabitation. Traditionally, studies of women were largely done from a Beckerian
perspective in which it was argued that women’s status would lead to a decline of
marriage (and fertility). Currently, we can speculate that a strong economic position
and career stability on the part of women might foster marriage. How this works
from a couple perspective is not yet clear. It could be that certainity on just one
side—either the man or the woman—is enough to make stronger union commit-
ments. In this case, one career supports the other. Alternatively, it could be that both
the man’s and the woman’s career need to have been settled before couples enter a
more committed union.
In this respect, it is somewhat unfortunate that analyses of marriage (timing or
formation) have often been one-sided, focusing either on men or on women. This
design is unavoidable given that the partner of a respondent is typically observed too
late, i.e., when the respondent is married or living with the partner. Empirically, this
problem does not exist when we observe cohabiting couples’ chances of marrying.
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123Some authors in the past have regarded the transition from cohabitation to marriage
as a two-sided problem and have analyzed economic characteristics of both partners
in one model (Lichter et al. 2006; Smock and Manning 1997). These studies have
not been able to examine the more important entry into a ﬁrst union, however. For
this transition, the problem can, in principle, be solved by examining dating couples
in a more systematic fashion. For example, prospective surveys could collect data
on the school and work careers of both members of a dating couple and
subsequently analyze whether or not (and when) they begin to live together, while
using the dissolution of the dating relationship as a competing risk. In this way, the
analysis of marriage and cohabitation can become truly two-sided and the economic
characteristics of men and women can be included in one model. There are some
innovative sociological studies of transitions from dating to cohabitation and
marriage, but so far, they have not focused on the partners’ economic characteristics
(Joyner and Kao 2005).
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